***IMACHUS:Why do you say that,Nicias?
NICIAS:Because you seem not to be aware that any one who has an intellectual affinity to Socrates and enters into conversation with him is liable to be drawn into an argument;and whatever subject he may start,he will be continually carried round and round by him,until at last he finds that he has to give an account both of his present and past life;and when he is once entangled,Socrates will not let him go until he has completely and thoroughly sifted him.Now I am used to his ways;and I know that he will certainly do as I say,and also that I myself shall be the sufferer;for I am fond of his conversation,Lysimachus.And I think that there is no harm in being reminded of any wrong thing which we are,or have been,doing:he who does not fly from reproof will be sure to take more heed of his after-life;as Solon says,he will wish and desire to be learning so long as he lives,and will not think that old age of itself brings wisdom.
To me,to be cross-examined by Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant;indeed,I knew all along that where Socrates was,the argument would soon pass from our sons to ourselves;and therefore,I say that for my part,Iam quite willing to discourse with Socrates in his own manner;but you had better ask our friend Laches what his feeling may be.
LACHES:I have but one feeling,Nicias,or (shall I say?)two feelings,about discussions.Some would think that I am a lover,and to others I may seem to be a hater of discourse;for when I hear a man discoursing of virtue,or of any sort of wisdom,who is a true man and worthy of his theme,I am delighted beyond measure:and I compare the man and his words,and note the harmony and correspondence of them.And such an one I deem to be the true musician,attuned to a fairer harmony than that of the lyre,or any pleasant instrument of music;for truly he has in his own life a harmony of words and deeds arranged,not in the Ionian,or in the Phrygian mode,nor yet in the Lydian,but in the true Hellenic mode,which is the Dorian,and no other.Such an one makes me merry with the sound of his voice;and when I hear him I am thought to be a lover of discourse;so eager am I in drinking in his words.But a man whose actions do not agree with his words is an annoyance to me;and the better he speaks the more Ihate him,and then I seem to be a hater of discourse.As to Socrates,Ihave no knowledge of his words,but of old,as would seem,I have had experience of his deeds;and his deeds show that free and noble sentiments are natural to him.And if his words accord,then I am of one mind with him,and shall be delighted to be interrogated by a man such as he is,and shall not be annoyed at having to learn of him:for I too agree with Solon,'that I would fain grow old,learning many things.'But I must be allowed to add 'of the good only.'Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher,or I shall be a dull and uncongenial pupil:but that the teacher is younger,or not as yet in repute--anything of that sort is of no account with me.And therefore,Socrates,I give you notice that you may teach and confute me as much as ever you like,and also learn of me anything which I know.So high is the opinion which I have entertained of you ever since the day on which you were my companion in danger,and gave a proof of your valour such as only the man of merit can give.Therefore,say whatever you like,and do not mind about the difference of our ages.
SOCRATES:I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to take counsel and advise with me.
***IMACHUS:But this is our proper business;and yours as well as ours,for I reckon you as one of us.Please then to take my place,and find out from Nicias and Laches what we want to know,for the sake of the youths,and talk and consult with them:for I am old,and my memory is bad;and Ido not remember the questions which I am going to ask,or the answers to them;and if there is any interruption I am quite lost.I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion by your selves;and I will listen,and Melesias and I will act upon your conclusions.
SOCRATES:Let us,Nicias and Laches,comply with the request of Lysimachus and Melesias.There will be no harm in asking ourselves the question which was first proposed to us:'Who have been our own instructors in this sort of training,and whom have we made better?'But the other mode of carrying on the enquiry will bring us equally to the same point,and will be more like proceeding from first principles.For if we knew that the addition of something would improve some other thing,and were able to make the addition,then,clearly,we must know how that about which we are advising may be best and most easily attained.Perhaps you do not understand what Imean.Then let me make my meaning plainer in this way.Suppose we knew that the addition of sight makes better the eyes which possess this gift,and also were able to impart sight to the eyes,then,clearly,we should know the nature of sight,and should be able to advise how this gift of sight may be best and most easily attained;but if we knew neither what sight is,nor what hearing is,we should not be very good medical advisers about the eyes or the ears,or about the best mode of giving sight and hearing to them.
LACHES:That is true,Socrates.
SOCRATES:And are not our two friends,Laches,at this very moment inviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be imparted to their sons for the improvement of their minds?
LACHES:Very true.
SOCRATES:Then must we not first know the nature of virtue?For how can we advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which we are wholly ignorant?
LACHES:I do not think that we can,Socrates.
SOCRATES:Then,Laches,we may presume that we know the nature of virtue?
LACHES:Yes.
SOCRATES:And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?