[12].For general discussions of these reforms,see Klein,Pattern of Land Tenure Reform;Froehlich,Land Tenure;Kenneth H.Parsons,"Land Reform in the Postwar Era,"Land Economics（August,1957）；Ervin J.Long,"The Economic Basis of Land Reform in Underdeveloped Countries,"Land Economics（May,1961）；Elias H.Tuma,"The Agrarian-Based Development Policy in Land Reform,"Land Economics（August,1963）；and Doreen Warriner,Land Reform and Economic Development（Cairo:National Bank of Egypt,1955）.None of these discussions,however,provide adequate information on property law changes as bases of these land reforms.For the situation in Japan,which is perhaps the most complicated,see R.P.Dore,Land Reform in Japan（London:Oxford University Press,1959）；Takekayu Ogura,ed.,Agricultural Development in Modern Japan（Tokyo:Japan F AO Association,1963）；Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,Agricultural Land Reform Legislation（Tokyo,1949）；Supreme Commander Allied Powers,Natural Resources Section Report no.79,Farm Tenancy in Japan（Tokyo,1947）；and Natural Resources Section Report no.127,Japanese Land Reform Program（Tokyo,1950）.For Korea,see C.C.Mitchell,"Land Reform in South Korea,"Pacific Affairs,vol.22,no.2（June,1949）.For the Philippines,see Bull,"Philippine Land Reform."For Vietnam,see J.P.Gittinger."Vietnamese Land Transfer Program,"Land Economics（May,1957）.For Iran,see B.H.Kristjanson,"The Agrarian-Based Development of Iran,"Land Economics（February,1960）；and V.Webster Johnson,"Agriculture in the Economic Development of Iran,"Land Economics（November,1960）.For Iraq,see Warren Adams,"Reflections of Recent Land Reform Experience in Iraq,"Land Economics（May,1963）；and M.H.Hashimi Rasool and Alfred L.Edwards,"Land Reform in Iraq:Economic and Social Implications,"Land Economics（February,1961）.Nowhere in the literature on Taiwan land reform,however,could I find an explicit statement that the United States had sponsored the reform.Elsewhere United States sponsorship is clear.See,for example,J.P.Gittinger,"United States Policy toward Agrarian Reform in Underdeveloped Nations,"Land Economics（August,1961）.
C.The Prereform Land Law
Before proceeding to the formal theory of share tenancy,let us investigate here the nature of farm land ownership in Taiwan before 1949—the system upon which the rental share reduction was imposed in the first phase of the reform.[1]We shall concentrate on the laws governing private farm lands:a total of 672,000 hectares,56 percent of which were under tenancy.[2]
The term"private ownership"as applied to Chinese law implies exclusivity in using certain rights.[3]The primary ownership right attached to private farm lands was the right to farm,which meant"the utilization of land through the application of labor and capital"（Article 80）.[4]Thus,the right to farm is the right to produce agricultural products as a source of income.[5] The spatial limit or dimension of the right was specified by the Civil Code,Arts.832 and 851,covering superficies.The time limit or the length of holding,according to the same articles,was in perpetuity.
Turning to the provisions governing the transfers of rights,which are important to the understanding of resource allocation under tenancy,we encounter a somewhat complex set of legal provisions which can be simplified as follows:
Outright Transfers
According to the prereform land law,land ownership was not freely alienable;that is,the owner could not transfer the ownership of his land to anyone whom he might choose.But in practice ownership transfer was almost unrestricted.It was stipulated that"the ownership of private farm land shall be transferred only to such transferees as can cultivate the land themselves after the transfer is effected（Art.30）."[6] But since a transferee who can cultivate may not necessarily do so himself,this stipulation in effect had little or no legal restriction on outright transfers.Another notable restriction was that,under tenancy,the tenant had preferential right to purchase.The tenant,however,was required to pay"the same terms as are offered to any other person."[7] This condition virtually nullified the tenant's preferential right to purchase,since to realize this right he must meet the highest offer made by anyone else.Indeed,the landowner（lessor）might create a fictitiously high price if he chose to sell discriminately.To conclude,restrictions on outright transfers were negligible.
Mortgage and Perpetual Lease
Land rights other than ownership as provided by the Chinese civil code include mortgage,yungtien,and dien-all essentially rights of transfer and not farming rights.The last two terms require explanation.
By yungtien is meant the right permanently to use another person's land for the purpose of cultivation or pasturing by paying a rent therefor[Civil Code,Art.842]；the yungtien-holder may transfer his right to another person[Civil Code,Art.843],but he may not sublease the land to another person[Civil Code,Art.845].
In short,yungtien is a conditional perpetual lease,and"if the rent which the yungtien-holder has failed to pay amounts to the equivalent of two years'total rent,the landowner may……revoke the yungtien"（Civil Code,Art.846）.
By dien is meant the right to take possession of another person's immovable property and to use it to enjoy incomes therefrom by paying a price for it[Civil Code,Art.911].The dien-holder may transfer the right to dien to another person[Civil Code,Art.917],or lease the property to another person under dien[Civil Code,Art.915].If the dien-6b\\gOY fails to redeem it at the original price within two years after the expiration of the contractual period of dien,the dien-ho\＆QY shall acquire the ownership of the property under dien[Civil Code,Art.923].
Thus,dien is an arrangement for transferring rights resembling mortgaging and leasing.
Ordinary Lease