[1].Under the auspices of the University of Nanking,Buck directed a forty-man team in the compilation of farming data in China during 1929-36.The original data,which appear to have passed unnoticed,are available in J.L.Buck,ed.,Land Utilization in China-Statistics-A Study of 16,786 Farms in 168 Localities and 38,256 Farm Families in Twenty-two Provinces in China,1929-1933（Nanking:University of Nanking,1937）.During the preparation of this impressive volume,Buck wrote the noted Chinese Farm Economy（1930）,and Land Utilization in China（1937）,both of which have been distributed by The University of Chicago Press.However,Buck's earlier works are also important:An Economic and Social Survey of 102 Farms near Wuhu,Anhwei,China（Nanking,1923）；An Economic and Social Survey of 150 Farms,Yehshan County,Hopei,China（Nanking,1926）；and Farm Ownership and Tenancy in China（Shanghai:National Christian Council,1927）.
Surveys by independent writers aside,other organizations which have con-ducted surveys include the Department of Internal Affairs,the Real Estate Bureau,the National Government Statistics Department,the Executive Yuan,and the Legislative Yuan.I have found these independent findings generally consistent with one another.
[2].This can be conveniently demonstrated in figure 3,chapter 2.Condition（a）is obtained by raising q/h,and condition（b）by lowering f/h.In either case,a higher value of（q-f）h is defined,resulting in a higher rental percentage.Note that these implications apply to fixed and share rents alike.
[3].Buck,Chinese Farm Economy,p.148.No further information is provided.
[4].Chinese National Government,Shengching Route Economic Report（1931）,p.102.
[5].See Legislative Yuan,Statistical Monthly（1930）,2,5；and Department of Internal Affairs,Public Reports of Internal Affairs（1932）,2,1；5,1 and 2.
[6].See table 4 in chapter 8 of this study.In Japan,the rental share restriction enacted in 1946 was a maximum of 25 percent of the yield for paddy,and 15 percent for upland fields,reflecting a recognition of the higher rental share for paddy fields under free market conditions.See Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,Agricultural Land Reform Legislation（Tokyo,1949）.
[7].Buck,Chinese Farm Economy,p.149.The rental shares provided are averages of sample farms in each locality（eleven localities in China,1921-25）,and the 66.6 percent cited is purely incidental.See table 2 in ibid.,p.148.
[8].These averages are computed from Chen,Land Rents of Various Provinces in China（Shanghai:Commercial Press,1936）,pp.102-3.
[9].These conditions can likewise be demonstrated by moving the q/h and flh curves in figure 3,chapter 2 accordingly.
[10].Andrew J.Grajdanzev,Modern Korea（New York:Institute of Pacific Relations,1944）.The average farm sizes are computed from data in table 2,p.291；and the land prices are seen in table 5,p.292.
[11].See Buck,Land Utilization in China,table 23,p.197.With minor differences in magnitude,identical patterns are seen in tables 7 and 8,pp.272-73.Note also that in ibid.,p.197,owner farms（average 4.22 acres）are larger than tenant farms（average 3.56 acres）.This is because tenancy occurs more frequently on paddy fields than on dry land everywhere.See Sidney Klein,The Pattern of Land Reform in East Asia after World War II（New York:Bookman Associates,1958）,p.229 ff.See also Buck,Statistics,chap.2,tables 23 and 26；and chap.7.
[12].Buck,Chinese Farm Economy,pp.156-57.Apparently failing to see that the rental percentage is a variable to insure efficient farming,Buck proceeded to discuss a program of"fair"rent.
[13].Ibid.Buck's finding is from a sample of 2,542 farms in fifteen localities,seven provinces,China.The slightly higher yields per acre in tenant farms are perhaps due to a higher proportion of paddy fields under tenancy,which Buck did not discern.For similar evidence,see Buck,Farm Ownership and Tenancy in China.
[14].Bray,"Farm Tenancy and Productivity in Agriculture:The Case of the United States,"Food Research Institute Studies（1963）,p.25.Although Bray provided no formal theory of share tenancy,the traditional argument did not pass his intuition:
The resource-efficiency argument is somewhat academic……Both tenant and landlord have an incentive to try to increase the marginal productivity of their own resources……neither wholly succeeds……For example,a landlord's suggestion that a third cultivation of the corn would pay（at no cost to him）may be met with the tenant's suggestion that the living room really would be improved by new wall-paper（at no cost to him）[ibid.,p.27].
The lack of significant difference in resource use among different leases is also noticed by Walter G.Miller,Walter E.Chryst,and Howard W.Ottoson,"Relative Efficiencies of Farm Tenure Classes in Intrafirm Resource Allocation,"Research Bulletin 461（Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics Experiment Station,November,1958）,pp.321-37.Evidence from the United States,however,is not heavily used in this study.This is because various government farm policies which result in different constraints on competition might have affected resource use under different contracts in different ways.
[15].These averages are computed from data in Andrew J.Grajdanzev,"Statistics of Japanese Agriculture,"mimeographed（New York:Institute of Pacific Relations,1941）,table 17,p.32.The findings are based on about ninety-five sample farms in each category.The same pattern is observed if"able-bodied man-units"are used instead of"number of members per family."For evidence from Taiwan,see chapter 7 of this study.