25. Lucilla saw Verus die， and then Lucilla died. Secunda saw Maximus die， and then Secunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die， and then Epitynchanus died. Antoninus saw Faustina die， and then Antoninus died. Such is everything. Celer saw Hadrianus die， and then Celer died. And those sharp-witted men， either seers or men inflated with pride， where are they？ for instance， the sharp-witted men， Charax and Demetrius the Platonist and Eud？mon， and any one else like them. All ephemeral， dead long ago. Some indeed have not been remembered even for a short time， and others have become the heroes of fables， and again others have disappeared even from fables. Remember this， then， that this little compound， thyself， must either be dissolved， or thy poor breath must be extinguished， or be removed and placed elsewhere.
26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man. Now it is a proper work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind， to despise the movements of the senses， to form a just judgment of plausible appearances， and to take a survey of the nature of the universe and of the things which happen in it.
27. There are three relations [between thee and other things]： the one to the body which surrounds thee； the second to the divine cause from which all things come to all； and the third to those who live with thee.
28. Pain is either an evil to the body—then let the body say what it thinks of it—or to the soul； but it is in the power of the soul to maintain its own serenity and tranquillity， and not to think that pain is an evil. For every judgment and movement and desire and aversion is within， and no evil ascends so high.
29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself： now it is in my power to let no badness be in this soul， nor desire， nor any perturbation at all； but looking at all things I see what is their nature， and I use each according to its value.—Remember this power which thou hast from nature.
30. Speak both in the senate and to every man， whoever he may be， appropriately， not with any affectation： use plain discourse.
31. Augustus’court， wife， daughter， descendants， ancestors， sister， Agrippa， kinsmen， intimates， friends， Areius， M？cenas， physicians and sacrificing priests—the whole court is dead. Then turn to the rest， not considering the death of a single man， [but of a whole race]， as of the Pompeii； and that which is inscribed on the tombs—the last of his race. Then consider what trouble those before them have had that they might leave a successor； and then， that of necessity some one must be the last. Again here consider the death of a whole race.
32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act； and if every act does its duty， as far as is possible， be content； and no one is able to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty.—But something external will stand in the way.—Nothing will stand in the way of thy acting justly and soberly and considerately， but perhaps some other active power will be hindered. Well， but by acquiescing in the hindrance and by being content to transfer thy efforts to that which is allowed， another opportunity of action is immediately put before thee in place of that which was hindered， and one which will adapt itself to this ordering of which we are speaking.
33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without arrogance； and be ready to let it go.
34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off， or a foot， or a head， lying anywhere apart from the rest of the body， such does a man make himself， as far as he can， who is not content with what happens， and separates himself from others， or does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast detached thyself from the natural unity—for thou wast made by nature a part， but now thou hast cut thyself off—yet here there is this beautiful provision， that it is in thy power again to unite thyself. God has allowed this to no other part， after it has been separated and cut asunder， to come together again. But consider the kindness by which he has distinguished man， for he has put it in his power not to be separated at all from the universal； and when he has been separated， he has allowed him to return and to be united and to resume his place as a part.
35. As the nature of the universal has given to every rational being all the other powers that it has， so we have received from it this power also. For as the universal nature converts and fixes in its predestined place everything which stands in the way and opposes it， and makes such things a part of itself， so also the rational animal is able to make every hindrance its own material， and to use it for such purposes as it may have designed.
36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy life. Let not thy thoughts at once embrace all the various troubles which thou mayest expect to befall thee： but on every occasion ask thyself， What is there in this which is intolerable and past bearing？ for thou wilt be ashamed to confess. In the next place remember that neither the future nor the past pains thee， but only the present. But this is reduced to a very little， if thou only circumscribest it， and chidest thy mind， if it is unable to hold out against even this.
37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the tomb of Verus？ Does Chaurias or Diotimus sit by the tomb of Hadrianus？ That would be ridiculous. Well， suppose they did sit there， would the dead be conscious of it？ and if the dead were conscious， would they be pleased？ and if they were pleased， would that make them immortal？ Was it not in the order of destiny that these persons too should first become old women and old men and then die？ What then would those do after these were dead？ All this is foul smell and blood in a bag.
38. If thou canst see sharp， look and judge wisely， says the philosopher.
39. In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is opposed to justice； but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of pleasure， and that is temperance.
40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears to give thee pain， thou thyself standest in perfect security. Who is this self？ The reason. But I am not reason. Be it so. Let then the reason itself not trouble itself. But if any other part of thee suffers， let it have its own opinion about itself （vii. 16）.