Ath. Let us assume that there is a motion able to move other things,but not to move itself;-that is one kind; and there is another kindwhich can move itself as well as other things, working incomposition and decomposition, by increase and diminution andgeneration and destruction-that is also one of the many kinds ofmotion.
Cle. Granted.
Ath. And we will assume that which moves other, and is changed byother, to be the ninth, and that which changes itself and others,and is co-incident with every action and every passion, and is thetrue principle of change and motion in all that is-that we shall beinclined to call the tenth.
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And which of these ten motions ought we to prefer as beingthe mightiest and most efficient?
Cle. I must say that the motion which is able to move itself isten thousand times superior to all the others.
Ath. Very good; but may I make one or two corrections in what I havebeen saying?
Cle. What are they?
Ath. When I spoke of the tenth sort of motion, that was not quitecorrect.
Cle. What was the error?
Ath. According to the true order, the tenth was really the firstin generation and power; then follows the second, which wasstrangely enough termed the ninth by us.
Cle. What do you mean?
Ath. I mean this: when one thing changes another, and thatanother, of such will there be any primary changing element? How can athing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change?
Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other, and that againother, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are setin motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the changeof the self-moving principle?
Cle. Very true, and I quite agree.
Ath. Or, to put the question in another way, making answer toourselves:-If, as most of these philosophers have the audacity toaffirm, all things were at rest in one mass, which of theabove-mentioned principles of motion would first spring up among them?
Cle. Clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in themarising out of any external cause; the change must first take place inthemselves.
Ath. Then we must say that self-motion being the origin of allmotions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well asamong things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle ofchange, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other issecond.
Cle. Quite true.
Ath. At this stage of the argument let us put a question.
Cle. What question?
Ath. If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, orfiery substance, simple or compound-how should we describe it?
Cle. You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving powerlife?
Ath. I do.
Cle. Certainly we should.
Ath. And when we see soul in anything, must we not do thesame-must we not admit that this is life?
Cle. We must.
Ath. And now, I beseech you, reflect;-you would admit that we have athreefold knowledge of things?
Cle. What do you mean?
Ath. I mean that we know the essence, and that we know thedefinition of the essence, and the name,-these are the three; andthere are two questions which may be raised about anything.
Cle. How two?
Ath. Sometimes a person may give the name and ask the definition; orhe may give the definition and ask the name. I may illustrate what Imean in this way.
Cle. How?
Ath. Number like some other things is capable of being dividedinto equal parts; when thus divided, number is named "even," and thedefinition of the name "even" is "number divisible into two equalparts"?
Cle. True.
Ath. I mean, that when we are asked about the definition and givethe name, or when we are asked about the name and give thedefinition-in either case, whether we give name or definition, wespeak of the same thing, calling "even" the number which is dividedinto two equal parts.
Cle. Quite true.
Ath. And what is the definition of that which is named "soul"? Canwe conceive of any other than that which has been already given-themotion which can move itself?
Cle. You mean to say that the essence which is defined as theself-moved is the same with that which has the name soul?
Ath. Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there isanything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin andmoving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and theircontraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of changeand motion in all things?
Cle. Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has beenmost satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things.
Ath. And is not that motion which is produced in another, byreason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, beingin truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or byany lower number which you may prefer?
Cle. Exactly.
Ath. Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolutetruth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that thebody is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul,which is the ruler?
Cle. Nothing can be more true.
Ath. Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was priorto the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of thebody?
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. Then characters and manners, and wishes and reasonings, andtrue opinions, and reflections, and recollections are prior tolength and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if the soul isprior to the body.
Cle. To be sure.
Ath. In the next place, must we not of necessity admit that the soulis the cause of good and evil, base and honourable, just and unjust,and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of allthings?
Cle. We must.
Ath. And as the soul orders and inhabits all things that move,however moving, must we not say that she orders also the heavens?
Cle. Of course.
Ath. One soul or more? More than one-I will answer for you; at anyrate, we must not suppose that there are less than two-one theauthor of good, and the other of evil.
Cle. Very true.