Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as achoice of magistrates, for every magistrate must also be a judge ofsome things; and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, yet incertain respects is a very important magistrate on the day on which heis determining a suit. Regarding then the judges also asmagistrates, let us say who are fit to be judges, and of what they areto be judges, and how many of them are to judge in each suit. Let thatbe the supreme tribunal which the litigants appoint in common forthemselves, choosing certain persons by agreement. And let there betwo other tribunals: one for private causes, when a citizen accusesanother of wronging him and wishes to get a decision; the other forpublic causes, in which some citizen is of opinion that the public hasbeen wronged by an individual, and is willing to vindicate thecommon interests. And we must not forget to mention how the judges areto be qualified, and who they are to be. In the first place, let therebe a tribunal open to all private persons who are trying causes oneagainst another for the third time, and let this be composed asfollows:-All the officers of state, as well annual as those holdingoffice for a longer period, when the new year is about to commence, inthe month following after the summer solstice, on the last day but oneof the year, shall meet in some temple, and calling God to witness,shall dedicate one judge from every magistracy to be theirfirst-fruits, choosing in each office him who seems to them to bethe best, and whom they deem likely to decide the causes of hisfellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the best and holiestmanner. And when the election is completed, a scrutiny shall be heldin the presence of the electors themselves, and if any one be rejectedanother shall be chosen in the same manner. Those who have undergonethe scrutiny shall judge the causes of those who have declined theinferior courts, and shall give their vote openly. The councillors andother magistrates who have elected them shall be required to behearers and spectators of the causes; and any one else may bepresent who pleases. If one man charges another with havingintentionally decided wrong, let him go to the guardians of the lawand lay his accusation before them, and he who is found guilty in sucha case shall pay damages to the injured party equal to half theinjury; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater penalty, thejudges shall determine what additional punishment he shall suffer, andhow much more he ought to pay to the public treasury, and to the partywho brought the suit.
In the judgment of offences against the state, the people ought toparticipate, for when any one wrongs the state all are wronged, andmay reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in thedecision. Such causes ought to originate with the people, and theought also to have the final decision of them, but the trial of themshall take place before three of the highest magistrates, upon whomthe plaintiff and the defendant shall agree; and if they are notable to come to an agreement themselves, the council shall chooseone of the two proposed. And in private suits, too, as far as ispossible, all should have a share; for he who has no share in theadministration of justice, is apt to imagine that he has no share inthe state at all. And for this reason there shall be a court of law inevery tribe, and the judges shall be chosen by lot;-they shall givetheir decisions at once, and shall be inaccessible to entreaties.
The final judgment shall rest with that court which, as we maintain,has been established in the most incorruptible form of which humanthings admit: this shall be the court established for those who areunable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of neighbours orof the tribes.
Thus much of the courts of law, which, as I was saying, cannot beprecisely defined either as being or not being offices; asuperficial sketch has been given of them, in which some things havebeen told and others omitted. For the right place of an exactstatement of the laws respecting suits, under their several heads,will be at the end of the body of legislation;-let us then expect themat the end. Hitherto our legislation has been chiefly occupied withthe appointment of offices. Perfect unity and exactness, extendingto the whole and every particular of political administration,cannot be attained to the full, until the discussion shall have abeginning, middle, and end, and is complete in every part. Atpresent we have reached the election of magistrates, and this may beregarded as a sufficient termination of what preceded. And now thereneed no longer be any delay or hesitation in beginning the work oflegislation.
Cle. I like what you have said, Stranger-and I particularly likeyour manner of tacking on the beginning of your new discourse to theend of the former one.
Ath. Thus far, then, the old men"s rational pastime has gone offwell.
Cle. You mean, I suppose, their serious and noble pursuit?
Ath. Perhaps; but I should like to know whether you and I are agreedabout a certain thing.
Cle. About what thing?
Ath. You know. the endless labour which painters expend upon theirpictures-they are always putting in or taking out colours, or whateverbe the term which artists employ; they seem as if they would nevercease touching up their works, which are always being made brighterand more beautiful.
Cle. I know something of these matters from report, although Ihave never had any great acquaintance with the art.
Ath. No matter; we may make use of the illustrationnotwithstanding:-Suppose that some one had a mind to paint a figure inthe most beautiful manner, in the hope that his work instead of losingwould always improve as time went on-do you not see that being amortal, unless he leaves some one to succeed him who will correctthe flaws which time may introduce, and be able to add what is leftimperfect through the defect of the artist, and who will furtherbrighten up and improve the picture, all his great labour will lastbut a short time?
Cle. True.