Cle. There is something ridiculous, Stranger, in our proposing suchan alternative as if we were legislators, simply bound under somegreat necessity which cannot be deferred to the morrow. But we, as Imay by grace of Heaven affirm, like, gatherers of stones orbeginners of some composite work, may gather a heap of materials,and out of this, at our leisure, select what is suitable for ourprojected construction. Let us then suppose ourselves to be atleisure, not of necessity building, but rather like men who are partlyproviding materials, and partly putting them together. And we maytruly say that some of our laws, like stones, are already fixed intheir places, and others lie at hand.
Ath. Certainly, in that case, Cleinias, our view of law will be morein accordance with nature. For there is another matter affectinglegislators, which I must earnestly entreat you to consider.
Cle. What is it?
Ath. There are many writings to be found in cities, and among themthere, are composed by legislators as well as by other persons.
Cle. To be sure.
Ath. Shall we give heed rather to the writings of those others-poetsand the like, who either in metre or out of metre have recordedtheir advice about the conduct of life, and not to the writings oflegislators? or shall we give heed to them above all?
Cle. Yes; to them far above all others.
Ath. And ought the legislator alone among writers to withhold hisopinion about the beautiful, the good, and the just, and not toteach what they are, and how they are to be pursued by those whointend to be happy?
Cle. Certainly not.
Ath. And is it disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtaeus and other poets tolay down evil precepts in their writings respecting life and thepursuits of men, but not so disgraceful for Lycurgus and Solon andothers who were legislators as well as writers? Is it not true that ofall the writings to be found in cities, those which relate to laws,when you unfold and read them, ought to be by far the noblest andthe best? and should not other writings either agree with them, orif they disagree, be deemed ridiculous? We should consider whether thelaws of states ought not to have the character of loving and wiseparents, rather than of tyrants and masters, who command and threaten,and, after writing their decrees on walls, go their ways; and whether,in discoursing of laws, we should not take the gentler view of themwhich may or may not be attainable-at any rate, we will show ourreadiness to entertain such a view, and be prepared to undergowhatever may be the result. And may the result be good, and if Godbe gracious, it will be good!
Cle. Excellent; let us do as you say.
Ath. Then we will now consider accurately, as we proposed, whatrelates to robbers of temples, and all kinds of thefts, and offencesin general; and we must not be annoyed if, in the course oflegislation, we have enacted some things, and have not made up ourminds about some others; for as yet we are not legislators, but we maysoon be. Let us, if you please, consider these matters.
Cle. By all means.
Ath. Concerning all things honourable and just, let us thenendeavour to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves, andhow far we are inconsistent, and how far the many, from whom at anyrate we should profess a desire to differ, agree and disagree amongthemselves.
Cle. What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us?
Ath. I will endeavour to explain. If I am not mistaken, we are allagreed that justice, and just men and things and actions, are allfair, and, if a person were to maintain that just men, even whenthey are deformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect ofthe excellent justice of their minds, no one would say that therewas any inconsistency in this.
Cle. They would be quite right.
Ath. Perhaps; but let us consider further, that if all thingswhich are just are fair and honourable, in the term "all" we mustinclude just sufferings which are the correlatives of just actions.
Cle. And what is the inference?
Ath. The inference is, that a just action in partaking of the justpartakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable.
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principlebe admitted to be in the same degree fair and honourable, if theargument is consistently carried out?
Cle. True.
Ath. But then if we admit suffering to be just and yetdishonourable, and the term "dishonourable" is applied to justice,will not the just and the honourable disagree?
Cle. What do you mean?
Ath. A thing not difficult to understand; the laws which have beenalready enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposedto what we are saying.
Cle. To what?
Ath. We had enacted, if I am not mistaken, that the robber oftemples, and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly beput to death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactmentsof a similar nature. But we stopped short, because we saw that thesesufferings are infinite in number and degree, and that they are, atonce, the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings.
And if this be true, are not the just and the honourable at one timeall the same, and at another time in the most diametrical opposition?
Cle. Such appears to be the case.
Ath. In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the languageof the many rend asunder the honourable and just.
Cle. Very true, Stranger.
Ath. Then now, Cleinias, let us see how far we ourselves areconsistent about these matters.
Cle. Consistent in what?
Ath. I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of thediscussion, but if I did not, let me now state-Cle. What?
Ath. That all bad men are always involuntarily bad; and from thismust proceed to draw a further inference.
Cle. What is it?