Ath. Then now we shall see why there is nothing wonderful instates going astray-the reason is that their legislators have suchdifferent aims; nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down astheir rule of justice, that certain individuals should bear rule inthe state, whether they be good or bad, and others that the citizensshould be rich, not caring whether they are the slaves of other men ornot. The tendency of others, again, is towards freedom; and somelegislate with a view to two things at once-they want to be at thesame time free and the lords of other states; but the wisest men, asthey deem themselves to be, look to all these and similar aims, andthere is no one of them which they exclusively honour, and to whichthey would have all things look.
Cle. Then, Stranger, our former assertion will hold, for we weresaying that laws generally should look to one thing only; and this, aswe admitted, was rightly said to be virtue.
Ath. Yes.
Cle. And we said that virtue was of four kinds?
Ath. Quite true.
Cle. And that mind was the leader of the four, and that to her thethree other virtues and all other things ought to have regard?
Ath. You follow me capitally, Cleinias, and I would ask you tofollow me to the end, for we have already said that the mind of thepilot, the mind of the physician and of the general look to that onething to which they ought to look; and now we may turn to mindpolitical, of which, as of a human creature, we will ask a question:-Owonderful being, and to what are you looking? The physician is able totell his single aim in life, but you, the superior, as you declareyourself to be, of all intelligent beings, when you are asked arenot able to tell. Can you, Megillus, and you, Cleinias, say distinctlywhat is the aim of mind political, in return for the many explanationsof things which I have given you?
Cle. We cannot, Stranger.
Ath. Well, but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see whereit is to be found?
Cle. For example, where?
Ath. For example, we were saying that there are four kinds ofvirtue, and as there are four of them, each of them must be one.
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And further, all four of them we call one; for we say thatcourage is virtue, and that prudence is virtue, and the same of thetwo others, as if they were in reality not many but one, that is,virtue.
Cle. Quite so.
Ath. There is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differfrom one another, and have received two names, and so of the rest. Butthere is more difficulty in explaining why we call these two and therest of them by the single name of virtue.
Cle. How do you mean?
Ath. I have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. Let usdistribute the subject questions and answers.
Cle. Once more, what do you mean?
Ath. Ask me what is that one thing which call virtue, and then againspeak of as two, one part being courage and the other wisdom. I willtell you how that occurs:-One of them has to do with fear; in this thebeasts also participate, and quite young children-I mean courage;for a courageous temper is a gift of nature and not of reason. Butwithout reason there never has been, or is, or will be a wise andunderstanding soul; it is of a different nature.
Cle. That is true.
Ath. I have now told you in what way the two are different, and doyou in return tell me in what way they are one and the same. Supposethat I ask you in what way the four are one, and when you haveanswered me, you will have a right to ask of me in return in whatway they are four; and then let us proceed to enquire whether in thecase of things which have a name and also a definition to them, trueknowledge consists in knowing the name only and not the definition.
Can he who is good for anything be ignorant of all this withoutdiscredit where great and glorious truths are concerned?
Cle. I suppose not.
Ath. And is there anything greater to the legislator and theguardian of the law, and to him who thinks that he excels all othermen in virtue, and has won the palm of excellence, that these veryqualities of which we are now speaking-courage, temperance, wisdom,justice?
Cle. How can there be anything greater?
Ath. And ought not the interpreters, the teachers the lawgivers, theguardians of the other citizens, to excel the rest of mankind, andperfectly to show him who desires to learn and know or whose evilactions require to be punished and reproved, what is the nature ofvirtue and vice? Or shall some poet who has found his way into thecity, or some chance person who pretends to be an instructor of youth,show himself to be better than him who has won the prize for everyvirtue? And can we wonder that when the guardians are not adequatein speech or action, and have no adequate knowledge of virtue, thecity being unguarded should experience the common fate of cities inour day?
Cle. Wonder! no.
Ath. Well, then, must we do as we said? Or can we give our guardiansa more precise knowledge of virtue in speech and action than themany have? or is there any way in which our city can be made toresemble the head and senses of rational beings because possessingsuch a guardian power?
Cle. What, Stranger, is the drift of your comparison?
Ath. Do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are not theyounger guardians, who are chosen for their natural gifts, placed inthe head of the state, having their souls all full of eyes, with whichthey look about the whole city? They keep watch and hand over theirperceptions to the memory, and inform the elders of all that happensin the city; and those whom we compared to the mind, because they havemany wise thoughts-that is to say, the old men-take counsel and makinguse of the younger men as their ministers, and advising with them-inthis way both together truly preserve the whole state:-Shall this orsome other be the order of our state? Are all our citizens to be equalin acquirements, or shall there be special persons among them who havereceived a more careful training and education?
Cle. That they should be equal, my; good, sir, is impossible.
Ath. Then we ought to proceed to some more exact training than anywhich has preceded.
Cle. Certainly.
Ath. And must not that of which we are in need be the one to whichwe were just now alluding?
Cle. Very true.